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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
JOHNNY FRANK SOSA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15929 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Convicted Person, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503, 1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the Second Judicial District 
Court for Weber County, before the Honorable Judge Duffy 
Palmer, without a jury. He was found guilty of a third 
degree felony as charged on September 22, 1977. Judge 
Palmer sentenced appellant to 0 - 5 years in the Utah State 
Prison on June 15, 1978. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of anpellant's 
conviction. 
STATEI-!ENT OF THE FACTS 
On the Fourth day of June, 1977, appellant dron 
a van up in front of a group of people on 25th Street in 
Ogden and fired at them with a rlfle (R. at 43,44). 
Shortly thereafter, three police officers from the 
Ogden City Police Department stopped a van matching the 
description of the truck driven by appellant (R. 15 48). 
The police were positive that it was appellant who exited 
frail' the driver's side when the truck came to a stop (R. at 
48,49). A .22 rifle without a stock but in operable conditi 
with a live round in the firing chamber was found under the 
front seat and a second, unloaded . 22 rifle was found bet~VeE· 
the . seats (R. at 51,53). 
On the 6th day of June, 1977, a complaint was 
issued in Ogden City Court against appellant for carrying 
a loaded gun in a vehicle and for rossession of marijuana. 
On July 5, 1977, appellant was found guilty of both charges 
in that court (R. at 40). 
-2-
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On June 7, 1977, appellant was charged with 
possession of a firearm by a convicted person (R. at 1). 
Appellant was tried and convicted of this charge on 
September 22, 1977 (R. at 63). Appellant was subsequently 
sentenced to serve 0 - 5 years at the Utah State Prison 
on June 15, 1977 (R. at 66). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SINCE THE TlvO OFFENSES COMNITTED 
BY APPELLANT WERE PROPLERY PROSECUTED 
IN SEPARATE COURTS, THE Tlo70 
PROSECUTIONS IVERE NOT MUTUALLY 
EXCLUSIVE UNDER UTAH CODE A!<N. 
§ 76-1-402(2) I 1953 AS AMENDED. 
Appellant contends that the present prosP~ution of 
a third degree felony, initiated in district court, should 
have been precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-403(l)a, 
1953 as amended, by his previous conviction of carrying a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in Ogden 
City Court. 
states: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-403(l)a, 1953 as amended, 
"If a defendant has been prosecuted 
for one or more offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
-3-
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prosecution for the same or a different 
offense is barred if: · 
(a) The subsequent prosecution 
is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under §-r6-l-402(2) 
in the former prosecution." 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(2) provides that: 
"1\Thenever conduct may establish 
offenses under a sing-le criminal 
episode, unless the court other-
wise orders to promote justice, 
a defendant should not be subject 
to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are 
within the jurisdicti6n of 
__ a si11gle court." 
Appellant contends that under the Utah ConsHtutic: 
the district court had technical jurisdiction of both the 
third degree felony and the Class B misdemeanor. The Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII § 7 provides: 
"The District Court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in 
this constitution, and not prohibited 
by law; appellate jurisdiction from 
all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the 
same . " 
Hevertheless, it is clear that the district court 
does not have original jurisdiction of both offensrs. ThiS 
-4-
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identical question was raised recently in State v. Cooley, 
Utah, 575 P.2d 693 (1978). In that case, the defendant 
committed three offenses within the same course of conduct. 
Two of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors and the third 
was an indictable misdemeanor, triable only in district 
court. This court cited Hakki v. Faux, 16 U.2d 132, 396 
P.2d 867 (1964) which held that the jurisdiction of a 
district court over a misdemeanor triable in justice's and 
city court, (Class B and C misdemeanors; see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-4-16, 1953 as amended prior to the "Circuit Court Act 
of 1977" and § 78-5-4 (1) (a)) could only be invoked by 
appeal or where it appears by the certificate that there is no 
justice of the peace in the county qualified to try the case. 
(Id. at 868) See also State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228, 72 
P.2d 626: 627 (1937). In Cooley, supra, this court went on 
to note that: 
"Article VIII, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution provides: 
The District Court shall 
have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in this Constitution, 
and not prohibited by law; .. 
(Emphasis in original). 
The legislature did provide by law 
the following: 
All public offenses triable 
in the district courts, except 
cases appealed from justices' 
-" 
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and city courts, must be 
prosecuted by information 
or indictment. • 
(Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
77-16-1) 
It thus is evident--th"2lt' the 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-402 
(2) {a) relating to a single criminal 
episode does not apply for the reason 
that the crime of failing to stop 
a vehicle at the command of a 
police officer cannot be tried in the 
same court where the other two crimes 
must be tried." 
As in Cooley, the offenses in the instant case 
were only triable in separate courts. Although the district 
court had appellate jurisdiction over the misdemeanor chargE, 
it is clear that it had no original -jurisdiction and that 
the offense could not have been prosecuted in that court. 
This is consistent with State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 
P.2d 1034 (194l) wherein the court distinguished original 
or independent jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction and 
then noted: 
"Original jurisdiction as used 
in the constitutional provision 
means an independent jurisdiction, 
one not based upon or limited to 
review of another court's judgment 
or proceedings." (Id. at 1038) 
The court then stated: 
"We determine then that the 
constitutional provision does not 
mean that regardless of statutory 
-6-
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rules, practice, and procedure, 
any civil or criminal matter, not 
expressly prohibited by law, may 
be commenced in the District Court. 
There being no constitutional 
inhibitions, the legislature may 
define and prescribe the forum 
in which actions may or must be 
commenced, and the procedure 
necessary to pass from one court to 
another." (Id. at 1039) 
Finally, the court held that: 
"It appears therefore that the 
proper venue for the commencement of 
an action for a non-indictable 
misdemeanor has been laid in the 
justice's court or the city court, 
While the District Court has general 
jurisdiction in all criminal matters, 
the proper procedure in misdemeanor 
cases as prescribed by statute is 
to commence the action in the city or 
justice's court. That ·rs·· the form, 
process, and procedure prescribed by 
statute for bringing into operation 
by appeal the action of the district 
court in such cases." (Id. at 1042) 
In the instant case, the jurisdiction of the 
district court with respect to appellant's class B misdemeanor 
offense was appellate only. Ogden City Court had no 
jurisdiction whatsoever of the felony charge and the district 
court had original jurisdiction. The two offenses were not 
within the jurisdiction of a single court and, therefore, 
could not have been tried together. The obvious intent of 
llt<Jh Code Ann. § 76-1-403 is to bar multiple prosecutions 
-7-
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when those actions could have been joined. To hold that 
prosecutions of separate offenses arising from the same 
course of conduct are mutually exclusive even when joinder 
is not possible would frustrate the intent and purpose of the 
legislature in creating and providing -for punishment of the 
separate offenses. Horeover, such a holding would leave the 
state in the undesirable position of having to choose to 
prosecute only some of the offenses committed by a defendant. 
Clearly such a result could, as in the instant case, frustra' 
sound public policy and circumvent the demands of justice. 
The law as laid down by this court in Cooley, supra, that 
ncn-joinable prosecutions are not mutually exclusive should 
be upheld and this conviction affirmed. 
provides: 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS PROPER 
SINCE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DOCTRINE 
DO:":S NOT Bl'.R A SUBSEQUENT PRO-
SECUTION OF A SEPAP~TE NON-
INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
• nor should any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense." 
This Court held in State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d, 354, 517 p,) 
1313 (1974) that: 
-8-
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"It is basic that the twice in 
jeopardy rule protects against 
subsequent prosecution only for the 
same offense." (Id. at 1314). 
It was also noted, in State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 
258 (1945) that: 
"A prosecution is for the 
entire offense and not for the 
separate elements thereof. If a 
prosecution is barred, it bars the 
entire action and not merely the 
use of certain elements thereof. 
So our question is, whether as a 
whole the acts charged in the two 
actions are the same. If they are, 
then the second prosecution is 
barred. If they are not, then the 
action is not barred even though 
some of the acts proved in the first 
prosecution are also elements of 
the second." (Id. at 262). 
The United States Supreme Court follows essentially the same 
rule. In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (I977), the court 
declared that: 
"The established test for 
determining whether two offenses 
are sufficiently distinguishable 
to permit the imposition of 
cumulative punishment was stated 
in Blockburger v. United States, 
284 u.s. 299, 304 52 s.ct. 180, 
182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): 
'The applicable rule 
is that where the same 
act or transaction con-
stitutes a violation of 
two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test 
to be applied to determine 
-9-
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whether there are two 
offenses or only one, 
is whether each provision 
requires proof of an 
additional fact which the 
other does not. 
This test emphasizes the elements of 
the two crimes. 'If each requires 
proof that the other does not, the 
Blockburger test would be satisfied, 
notwithstanding a substantial over-
lap in the proof offered to establish 
the crimes. '" (citations omitted) 
"If bvo offenses are the same 
under this test for purposes of 
barring consecutive sentences at a 
single trial, they necessarily will 
be the same for purposes of barring 
successive prosecutions." (Id. at 166) 
In the instant case, the elements of the offens~ 
charged in separate prosecutions differ. Either offense 
could have been established without establishing the other. 
Appellant's first conviction was for carrying a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-SOS: 
"Every person who carries a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle or 
on any public street in an in-
corporated city or in a prohibited 
area of an unincorporated territory 
within this state is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor." (Emohasis added) 
(See also Utah Code Ann. 5. 23-20-2] 
1953 as amended, which proscribes 
the same conduct and, insofar as is 
pertinent to this problem, renuires 
proof of essentially the same clements). 
-]()-
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A conviction under this statute would require 
that any person carried a loaded firearm in a vehicle 
within the stated areas. 
Appellant's second conviction, which is the subject 
of this appeal, was for possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a convicted person in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503, 1953 as amended: 
"Any person who is not a citizen 
of the United States, or any person 
who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of the United 
States, the state of Utah, or any 
other state, government, or country, 
or who is addicted to the use of any 
narcotic drug, or any person who has 
been declared mentally incompetent 
shall not own or have in his 
possession or under his custody or 
control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in this part. Any person 
who violates this section is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, and if the 
dangerous weapon is a firearm or 
sawed-off shotgun he shall be guiltv 
of a felony of the third degree. 
Under this statute, a prosecution would have to 
show that the defendant was one of the types of persons 
prohibited from possessing weapons but not that the firearm 
was loaded. In short, the state could have established the 
necessary elements for conviction in either prosecution 
without establishing the elements required in the other 
-11-
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prosecution. In accordance with Harris, Thatcher, and~ 
all supra, the doctrine of double or former jeopardy does nc 
apply. See also State v. Gandee, Utah, case No. 15635, file 
November 3, 1978. 
Appellant cites Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 
(1970) , to indicate that the two offenses need not be 
identical for double jeopardy to apply. However, the. iss~ 
in that case concerned the concept of "dual sovereignty". 
The court specifically noted that: 
"We act on the statement of the 
District Court of Appeal that the 
second trial on the felony charge by 
information 'was based on the same 
acts of the appellant as were 
involved in the violation of the two 
city ordinances' and on the assumption 
that the ordinance violations were 
included offenses of the felony charge. 
Whether in fact and law petitioner 
committed separate offenses which 
could support senarate changes was not 
decided by the Florida courts, nor do 
we reach that question. What is 
before us is the asserted power of 
the two courts within one state to 
place petitioner on trial for the 
same alleged crime." (Id. at 390). 
It was assumed in Waller that the two offenses were ide~~ 
The case cannot be taken to establish that two offenses nee; 
not be identical to support a double jeopardv claim. 
In Brown v. Ohio, sunra, also rc>lied upon by 
appellant, the court noted the ElocY:hurqcr test cit0d i\bove 
and then held th~t: 
-12-
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"Applying the Blockburger test, 
we agree with the Ohio Court of 
Appeals that joyriding and auto 
theft! as defined by the court, 
const1tute 'the same statutory offense' 
within the meaning of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. App. 23. For it 
is clearly not the case that 'each 
statute requires proof of an additional 
fact which the other does not.' 
284 u.s. at 304, 52 S.Ct., at 182. As 
is invariably true of a greater and 
lesser included offense, the lesser 
offense - joyriding - requires no 
proof beyond that which is required 
for conviction of the greater - auto 
theft. The greater offense is therefore 
by definition the 'same' for purposes 
of double jeopardy as any lesser 
offense included in it." (Id. at 168) 
As has already been noted in the instant case, 
different elements had to be proven in each of the prosecutions, 
neither established the other. Double jeopardy does not apply 
and the trial court was correct in ruling that the felony 
prosecution was not barred by the prior misdemeanor conviction 
in city court. 
CONCLUSION 
Although appellant was convicted in Ogden City 
Court of a misdemeanor arising out of the same course of 
conduct which gave rise to the instant felony prosecution, this 
action is not barred by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, 1953 as 
amenden, because the actions could not have originated in 
the same court. 
-13-
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The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply 
because the establishment of each offense requires proof 
of different elements: neither is subsumed within the 
other. 
For these reasons, appellant's conviction of a thi 
degree felony in district court was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIA~ W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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